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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the constitutionalisation of the test for statutory illegality (the 
test) in South African contract law, firstly through a careful evaluation of the manner in 
which the Constitutional Court (CC) applied the test in Cool Ideas v Hubbard, secondly 
through the manner in which the CC purports to constitutionalise the test in the said 
case, and thirdly through asking if such a method is desirable in the constitutional 
dispensation. It can be conceded that the approach taken by the main judgment to the 
application of the test in this case is more compelling than that taken by Froneman J. 
However, the fundamental differences in these approaches, particularly in the 
determination of the impact of the Constitution and its underlying values, highlight the 
need for an investigation into the test and the way it should operate in the constitutional 
dispensation. The paper begins by setting out the test and shows that it is capable of 
reflecting the values that underlie the Constitution (while maintaining a workable level 
of legal certainty) and that the test can operate in a manner that enhances the vision 
and goals of the Constitution. It also proposes a framework within which the various 
factors of the test should be weighed up, with a view to determining whether the 
contract under investigation is valid or invalid. Then the paper evaluates the CC's 
application of the test. It criticises the main judgment for its incomplete undertaking of 
the enquiry envisaged in sections 8(1) and (2) of the Constitution, as it took into 
account neither the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning section 25(1), nor the 
fundamental values of the Constitution. It also criticises Froneman J's judgment for 
not connecting the value of fairness with the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning 
section 25(1) or the broader fundamental values of the Constitution. Thereafter, it 
considers the manner in which the CC purports to constitutionalise the test. It points 
out that equity considerations apply in all matters, whether a substantive right is 
implicated or not, as they ensure that the "application" and "interpretation" of a statute 
enhance and are in line with the "objective normative value system" that is the Bill of 
Rights. Lastly, it considers the desirability of the CC's approach to the application of 
the test and its constitutionalisation. It points out that the main judgment goes to the 
extremes of objectivity in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Housing 
Consumers Protection Measures Act, 1998 (within the application of the test), while 
Froneman J goes to the extremes of subjectivity. In this regard, it suggests that courts 
can use the "balance of convenience" test to adjust their decisions to accommodate 
the circumstances of each case. Therefore, it concludes that the approach to 
constitutionalising the test lies somewhere between that of the main judgment and that 
of Froneman J. 
Keywords 
Contract law; statutory illegality; constitutionalisation; Cool Ideas v Hubbard. 
…………………………………………………….  
The Constitutionalisation of the Test for  
Statutory Illegality in South African Contract Law:  
Cool Ideas v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 474 (CC) 
O Golela* 
 
Pioneer in peer-reviewed,  
open access online law publications 
Author  
Odwa Golela  
Affiliation 
University of Witwatersrand 
South Africa 
Email  
Golela.Odwa@gmail.com  
Date of submission 
16 October 2017 
Date published  
3 April 2018 
Editor Prof H Chitimira 
How to cite this article   
Golela O "The Constitutionali-
sation of the Test for Statutory 
Illegality in South African Contract 
Law: Cool Ideas v Hubbard 2014 4 
SA 474 (CC)" PER / PELJ 
2018(21) - DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-
3781/2018/v21i0a3293 
Copyright 
 
DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-
3781/2018/v21i0a3293 
O GOLELA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  2 
1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the constitutionalisation of the test for statutory 
illegality (the test) in South African contract law. In particular, it evaluates 
how the Constitutional Court (CC) purports to constitutionalise the test in 
the recent case of Cool Ideas v Hubbard.1 The focus is primarily on the 
following issues: firstly, whether the CC applied the test correctly; secondly, 
whether the CC investigated the different factors in the test (those 
considered when the legislature has not expressly stated its intention about 
the fate of the contract); and lastly, how the CC purports to incorporate the 
Constitution and its underlying values into the test (to constitutionalise it).  
The fundamentally different approaches taken in the three judgments (the 
majority judgment written by Majiedt AJ and the separate judgments of Jafta 
J and Froneman J) in Cool Ideas v Hubbard highlight the importance of an 
investigation into the test and the way it should operate, particularly in the 
constitutional dispensation. Cool Ideas v Hubbard further highlights the 
potential injustice that may result from the lack of concrete guidance as to 
how the test is to be constitutionalised. 
The first part of this paper sets out the test in South African contract law. 
This part shows that the test is capable of reflecting the values that underlie 
the Constitution (while maintaining a workable level of legal certainty). It 
further shows that the test can operate in a manner that enhances the vision 
and goals of the Constitution – to form a democratic society, founded on 
"democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights",2 as a 
framework within which the various factors of the test should be weighed 
up, with a view to determining whether the contract under investigation is 
valid or invalid is proposed. The second part of the paper then sums up the 
findings of the CC in Cool Ideas v Hubbard in relation to the test. Then the 
following part first evaluates whether the CC applied the test correctly. Here 
the focus will be on the different approaches to the test adopted in the main 
judgment, the concurring judgment of Jafta J and the dissenting judgment 
                                            
* Odwa Golela. LLB (UFH); LLM (Commercial and Business Law) (Wits); CIMA cert 
BA. Former employee, Legal Services Department, Multichoice, Johannesburg. 
Email: Golela.Odwa@gmail.com. This contribution is adapted from an LLM research 
report completed by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree 
Master of Laws at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg under the 
supervision of Professor Deeksha Bhana – to whom I am extremely grateful. 
1 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 474 (CC) (Cool Ideas v Hubbard). 
2 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Limited: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21 
(Hyundai Motor Distributors). 
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of Froneman J. Secondly, it considers the way in which the CC purports to 
constitutionalise the test in Cool Ideas v Hubbard. Here the focus will be on 
how the CC intends for the Constitution and its underlying values to operate 
in the application of the test. Finally, it discusses whether the approach 
adopted by the CC in the application of the test and its constitutionalisation 
is desirable.  
2 The common law test for statutory illegality 
Legality is one of the requirements for the formation of a valid contract, but 
in some instances an agreement tainted by illegality will give rise to a 
contract, but such a contract will be unenforceable.3 An agreement will be 
illegal if it violates a statutory prohibition or a common law rule.4 However, 
a statutory prohibition on its own does not necessarily invalidate the 
agreement.5 In some cases the statute may expressly state that a contract 
that violates its prohibitions is invalid and courts will give effect to the 
intention of the legislature as expressed in that statute.6 Difficulties arise in 
those cases where the statute does not expressly state whether a contract 
violating its provisions is invalid. Here the courts must ascertain the intention 
of the legislature through interpreting the statute.7 In this inquiry the 
following factors must be considered: the language of the provision in 
question, the object of the provision in the light of the object of the statute 
as a whole, the mischief it seeks to prevent, the presence of civil or criminal 
liability, any perceivable implication of inconvenience and injustice that may 
result from declaring the agreement invalid, and the constitutional mandate 
of promoting the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."8 Courts 
have been warned not to hastily declare contracts invalid for violating 
statutes and thereby deprive contracting parties from the relief available in 
contract law unless the legislature's intention (as implied by the statutory 
                                            
3 Van der Merwe et al Contract 165; also see Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 
1986 3 SA 181 (A) paras 181D-E (Metro Western Cape). 
4 Van der Merwe et al Contract 166; also see Bhana, Nortje and Bonthuys Student's 
Guide 162. 
5 Van der Merwe et al Contract 174; also see Bhana, Nortje and Bonthuys Student's 
Guide 237; Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway Contract 271. 
6 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 351; also see Bhana, Nortje and Bonthuys 
Student's Guide 162; Metro Western Cape para 181E. 
7 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 181; also see Kerr Principles of the Law of 
Contract 193; ABSA Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Luttig 1997 4 SA 229 (SCA) para 
238F (ABSA Insurance Brokers). 
8 ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 238I-239A; also see Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 142 (SCA) para 4 (hereafter 
Contractprops); Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182; Bhana, Nortje and 
Bonthuys Student's Guide 166-167; Metro Western Cape paras 188G-H. 
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provision) so dictates.9 These factors must be weighed up with a view to 
exercising a value judgment to determine whether the contract is valid or 
void. The relative weight of each factor depends on the circumstances of 
the case. These factors can be set out pictorially to allow for a proper and 
visual weighing up process and the categorical imputation of the relevant 
contextual factors using table 1 below: 
Table 1: The test for statutory illegality in South African contract law 
framework 
 Contract falls within conduct prohibited by statute  
Text of 
statutory 
provision 
Purpose of 
the 
provision 
informed by 
that 
of statute 
Public-private law divide Balance of 
Convenience 
test 
Constitution 
Peremptory 
formulated 
terms 
Object of 
statute - 
purposive 
approach 
(internal & 
external 
interpretive 
tools) 
Public-private 
Contractual 
relationship 
Purely private 
Contractual 
relationship 
Implication of 
declaration of 
invalidity  
Bhana's 
model: 
Substantive 
inquiry ss 8(1) 
& 
(2) – extent of 
horizontality 
 
Permissive 
formulated 
terms 
Mischief rule 
inquiry 
to determine 
mischief 
guarded 
by statute 
Administrative 
and contract 
law 
principles apply 
Contract law 
principles apply 
Implication of 
declaration of 
validity  
Bhana's 
model: 
Procedural 
inquiry ss 8(3) 
& 
39(2) – how 
horizontality 
operates in 
the 
case 
Indication of 
validity/ 
invalidity 
Prohibition 
backed 
by penalty – 
penalty 
sufficiently 
protects the 
object? 
Indication of 
invalidity 
Indication of 
validity/invalidity 
Onus on 
contract-
asserter 
to prove 
burden or 
injustice of 
declaration of 
invalidity  
S 39(2) 
constitutional 
values-based 
inquiry 
 Contract valid/ invalid  
 
When a contract violates a statute, its validity or invalidity is first sought from 
the text of the statutory provision in question.10 The validity of a contract will 
be in question if it falls within the conduct that the statute expressly or 
                                            
9 Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 193; also see St John Shipping Corporation v 
Joseph Rank Ltd 1957 1 QB 267. 
10 Van der Merwe et al Contract 174; see as an example Municipal Manager: Qaukeni 
Local Municipality v FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 356 (SCA) para 12 (Qaukeni 
Local Municpality); Contractprops paras 5-6. 
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impliedly prohibits.11 In considering whether the text of the statute impliedly 
points to the validity or invalidity of the contract, the court has to consider 
whether the statutory provision in question is formulated in peremptory or 
permissive terms. In this sense, a peremptory term is one that is to be strictly 
adhered to and non-adherence suggests that the text of the statute points 
to the contract being invalid.12 On the other hand, a permissive term is one 
that condones partial or non-adherence with its provisions.13 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA) has pointed out that the distinction between 
peremptory and permissive terms serves only as a guide to the courts in the 
determination of whether the text of the statute points to the contract being 
valid or invalid.14 
Courts have to bear the object of the statute in mind in assessing whether 
a particular provision is peremptory or permissive.15 Courts have formulated 
guidelines to help them ascertain whether the terms of that particular 
provision are peremptory or permissive.16 These guidelines include: 
semantic guidelines, jurisprudential guidelines and certain "mini-
presumptions."17 
Semantic guidelines focus on the linguistic meaning of the text of the 
statutory provision in question. First, words of a commanding nature 
suggest that the provision is peremptory.18 In Bezuidenhout v AA Mutual 
Insurance Association Ltd the Appellate Division (AD) (as it then was) 
pointed out that the word "shall" strongly suggests that the provision in 
question is peremptory.19 On the other hand, in 
Motorvoertuigassuransiefunds v Gcwabe it was found that the word "shall" 
will not in all cases mean that the provision in question is peremptory.20 This 
                                            
11 Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 188; also see Hutchison and Pretorius Law of 
Contract 181. 
12 Botha Statutory Interpretation 176; also see Henry v Branfield 1996 1 SA 244 (C) 
paras 250B-C (the Henry case). 
13 Botha Statutory Interpretation 176; also see the Henry case paras 250B-C. 
14 Botha Statutory Interpretation 176; also see the Henry case paras 250B-C. Also see 
Weeven Transitional Council v Van Dyk 2002 4 SA 653 (SCA) para 13; Unlawful 
Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 4 SA 199 (SCA) para 22, where 
the SCA emphasised that non-adherence with a peremptory provision will not 
necessarily lead to the invalidity of that particular conduct, and that the court has to 
determine whether the purpose of the provision has, nonetheless, been attained. 
15 Botha Statutory Interpretation 177. 
16 Botha Statutory Interpretation. 
17 Botha Statutory Interpretation 177-179. 
18 Botha Statutory Interpretation 178. 
19 Bezuidenhout v AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd 1978 1 SA 703 (A) 
(Bezuidenhout case); see also Botha Statutory Interpretation 178.  
20 Motorvoertuigassuransiefunds v Gcwabe 1979 4 SA 786 (A) 
(Motorvoertuigassuransiefunds case); also see Botha Statutory Interpretation 178. 
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shows that the presence of a commanding word in a statutory provision 
(particularly in the operation of the test for statutory illegality) will not 
necessarily mean that the text of the statute points to the contract in 
question as being invalid. Secondly, permissive words like "may" show that 
the persons at whom the statute is directed have a choice and such a 
provision will be seen as permissive.21 Thirdly, text that is negatively 
formulated suggests that the particular provision is peremptory, while text 
that is positively formulated indicates that the provision is permissive.22 In 
the realm of contract law, the operation of the former principle (negatively 
formulated text) in the test for statutory illegality was demonstrated in Lende 
v Goldberg,23 where the court had to determine whether an employment 
contract that did not adhere to the requirements of the Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act24 was to be visited with invalidity.25 In considering the 
implicated provision in that case, the court acknowledged that the wording 
of that provision began with "[n]o person shall", which meant that the 
provision was negatively formulated and therefore pointed to the contract in 
question being invalid.26 Lastly, when a statutory provision is couched in 
open-ended language it is seen as being permissive.27 
The courts have also established jurisprudential guidelines to assist them in 
deciding whether a particular provision is peremptory or permissive.28 
These guidelines focus on the implications of choosing either that the terms 
of the provision in question are peremptory or permissive in the 
determination of whether the text of the statute points to the contract being 
valid or invalid. 
The courts have further established "mini-presumptions" regarding 
particular instances, which also serve as guidelines in determining whether 
a particular provision is peremptory or permissive.29 First, when the statute 
only protects government income, it is presumed not to invalidate the non-
compliant contract, regardless of the attachment of liability.30 Secondly, 
when a statute grants a "right, privilege or immunity", its provisions are 
                                            
21 Botha Statutory Interpretation 178. 
22 Botha Statutory Interpretation. 
23 Lende v Goldberg 1983 2 SA 284 (C) (the Lende case). 
24 Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945. S 10 bis of this Act required 
black persons to be in possession of a work permit that indicated that they were 
authorised to be within certain areas.  
25 The Lende case paras 287C-D. 
26 The Lende case paras 288E-G. 
27 Botha Statutory Interpretation 178. 
28 Botha Statutory Interpretation 178. 
29 Botha Statutory Interpretation 179. 
30 Botha Statutory Interpretation 179. 
O GOLELA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  7 
presumed to be peremptory and for such "right, privilege or immunity" to be 
claimed, the terms of that particular statute must be completely adhered 
to.31 Thirdly, if a declaration of invalidity because of non-adherence with a 
particular statutory provision would render other provisions useless, it is 
presumed that such a provision is permissive.32 Lastly, if a statute contains 
a time limit to perform particular conduct and the court has not been granted 
the power to extend such a time limit, it is presumed that such a provision 
is peremptory.33 
Further, the courts consider the object of the particular provision as informed 
by the object of the statute as a whole in order to determine whether the 
legislature intended for a contract that falls within the prohibited conduct to 
be valid or invalid.34 The courts ordinarily adopt a purposive approach in 
interpreting statutory provisions. As such, the words of the particular 
provision are contextualised and internal and external interpretive 
mechanisms are used to ascertain the object of the statute.35 In addition, 
courts also use "interpretive factors such as the principles of justice, fair 
play, convenience, logic, effectiveness and morality."36 In the application of 
the test these considerations are meant to operate in the light of the warning 
that courts should not hastily declare contracts invalid for statutory illegality. 
Further, the courts should consider the object of the statute, particularly 
whether the contract under investigation achieves that object or vitiates it, 
in order to ascertain whether a declaration of validity would ultimately defeat 
the object. In this regard the courts will take into account whether the statute 
protects only a particular segment of the public or if it protects a legitimate 
public concern by invalidating the contract.37 In the latter case, an inference 
can be drawn that the legislature's intention points to the contract’s being 
invalid.38 
Ultimately, if allowing the contract under investigation to endure would 
vitiate the object of the statute, this suggests that the contract should be 
declared invalid.39 An example of this can be found in ABSA Insurance 
Brokers, where the SCA had to determine first whether an agreement was 
                                            
31 Botha Statutory Interpretation 179. 
32 Botha Statutory Interpretation 179. 
33 Botha Statutory Interpretation 180. 
34 ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 238I-239G; also see Contractprops paras 6-7. 
35 Botha Statutory Interpretation 177. 
36 Botha Statutory Interpretation 177. 
37 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182. 
38 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182. 
39 Botha Statutory Interpretation; see also ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 239G-H. 
O GOLELA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  8 
prohibited by the Insurance Act,40 and if the answer is in the affirmative, 
secondly whether such prohibition rendered the agreement invalid.41 In its 
application of the test, the SCA emphasised the importance of the object of 
the statute in the inquiry.42 It found the object of the statute in that case to 
be the protection of the public, by providing for the way in which brokers 
should handle premiums held on behalf of insurers and by ensuring that 
such premiums are handled with care.43 On this point, it held that if the 
prohibited contract were permitted to exist, this would vitiate the object of 
the statute and therefore concluded that the agreement was invalid.44 
Together with the consideration of the object of the particular statute, the 
courts also consider the mischief the statute seeks to prevent in order to 
determine whether the legislature intended for a contract that falls within the 
prohibited conduct to be invalid.45 If allowing the non-compliant contract to 
endure would result in the mischief that the statute seeks to prevent, then 
an inference can be drawn that the legislature intended for such a contract 
to be invalid.46 
In the realm of contract law, the mischief rule seeks to contextualise the 
statute in question through understanding it from its historical basis, in order 
to ascertain the situation that culminated in the enactment of that statute.47 
It should be noted that in the operation of the test, the object of the statute 
and the mischief the statute seeks to prevent ordinarily go hand-in-hand and 
therefore should not be isolated from each other. In assessing the mischief 
the statute seeks to prevent, the courts ordinarily follow a four-fold inquiry. 
First, they have to determine what the pre-existing legal regime was prior to 
the enactment of the statute in question.48 Secondly, they have to determine 
the mischief that was insufficiently catered for under the pre-existing legal 
regime.49 Thirdly, they have to determine the manner in which the statute in 
question (the new legal regime) purports to prevent such mischief.50 Lastly, 
                                            
40 Insurance Act 27 of 1943. 
41 ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 235I-236A. 
42 ABSA Insurance Brokers para 239A. 
43 ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 239B-F. 
44 ABSA Insurance Brokers paras 239F-G, 241B. 
45 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182; also see Bhana, Nortje and Bonthuys 
Student's Guide 166-167; Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 355; Qaukeni Local 
Municpality para 15; Pottie v Kotze 1954 3 SA 719 (A) paras 726C-727A (the Pottie 
case). 
46 Qaukeni Local Municpality para 15; also see the Pottie case para 726H. 
47 Botha Statutory Interpretation 152. 
48 Botha Statutory Interpretation 152. 
49 Botha Statutory Interpretation 152. 
50 Botha Statutory Interpretation 152. 
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they have to determine the actual purpose of the legislature's preference for 
the particular manner in which the statute in question purports to prevent 
the mischief.51 
An example of the application of this inquiry within the test for statutory 
illegality can be found in the Pottie case, where the AD (as it then was) had 
to determine whether a sale agreement that violated the Transvaal Motor 
Vehicle Ordinance52 should be declared invalid.53 The court considered the 
mischief the particular provision sought to prevent and the purpose of the 
Ordinance.54 In this regard, the court emphasised that an agreement that 
violates a statutory provision will be declared invalid if allowing it to exist 
would result in "the very situation which the Legislature wishes to prevent".55 
On this point, the court held that the Ordinance had enough avenues for 
ensuring compliance with its provisions to the extent that the mischief 
guarded by the Ordinance will not surface and therefore concluded that the 
agreement was valid.56 However, a different conclusion was reached in 
Qaukeni Local Municipality, where the SCA had to determine whether a 
tender agreement that did not conform to the statutory requirements for 
tenders should be declared invalid.57 The SCA considered the mischief the 
statute sought to prevent – which was to prevent a situation where provincial 
tenders were awarded in an unfair manner.58 The court pointed out that if 
an agreement that does not adhere to statutory requirements were declared 
valid in circumstances similar to those of this case, this would bring about 
the mischief the statute sought to prevent and therefore concluded that the 
contract was invalid.59 
The difference between these two cases is that the former case involves 
two private parties, while the latter case involves a public-private 
relationship. It appears that courts distinguish between contracts entered 
into by and between private parties and contracts entered into by and 
between a private party and a public authority in the application of the test, 
particularly in the consideration of the mischief (as a factor in the test).60 
                                            
51 Botha Statutory Interpretation 152. 
52 Transvaal Motor Vehicle Ordinance 17 of 1931. 
53 The Pottie case para 723B. 
54 The Pottie case paras 726C-727C. 
55 The Pottie case para 726H. 
56 The Pottie case para 727A. 
57 Qaukeni Local Municpality para 1. 
58 Qaukeni Local Municpality paras 15-16. 
59 Qaukeni Local Municpality para 16. 
60 For further detail see Cachalia 2016 Stell LR 93-94, where she states that courts 
distinguish between "government contracts" that are governed by contract law and 
those governed by administrative law. Within this distinction, she suggests that 
O GOLELA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  10 
This distinction is in line with the consideration of whether the statute in 
question protects only a segment of the public or a legitimate public concern 
in the determination of the object of the statute.61 In Qaukeni Local 
Municipality the SCA confirmed its earlier decisions in Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government v Contractprops62 and Premier, Free State v 
Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd,63 in that when a contract between a private 
party and a public authority does not adhere to the requirements set out by 
a statute, in order to encourage competition among bidders for public 
contracts, such a contract will be declared invalid.64 The reason for this 
approach appears to be that the mere fact that the said contract does not 
adhere to statutory requirements means that it already has the effect of 
bringing about the mischief the statute seeks to prevent.65 While the reasons 
for the distinction made by the SCA are to some extent unclear, the 
distinction may be justified on the ground that public-private contractual 
relationships may have an impact on the greater public that did not partake 
in the conclusion of the contract. Hence the need for a strict approach to 
protect such members of the public.66 In private contractual relationships, 
on the other hand, the courts adopt a more flexible approach, because the 
parties negotiated the contractual terms and chose to be bound by them, 
and such terms largely have an impact only on the parties (owing to the 
principle of the sanctity of contract). However, it seems that this distinction 
might be unnecessary (at least within the consideration of the mischief in 
the application of the test), as the court may consider the mischief (as a 
factor in the test) with a view to making a value judgment whether to declare 
the contract valid or invalid, then consider the nature of the contracting 
parties and the impact of the contract on the public when considering the 
inconveniences and injustices that may result from its value judgment. In 
this way the test would be remedied from the potential fragmentation that 
this distinction may bring about in its operation. In essence (as the law 
stands), in private contractual relationships it appears that the courts 
                                            
courts should exercise a value judgment as to the degree to which the state should 
be treated differently from its private contractant, after considering issues of 
bargaining power, the nature of the power used by the State (strictly contractual or 
statutory powers) and public interest considerations.  
61 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182. 
62 Contractprops para 4. 
63 Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 413 (SCA). 
64 Qaukeni Local Municpality paras 15-16. 
65 Qaukeni Local Municpality para 15. 
66 Cachalia 2016 Stell LR 89, where she suggests that when the government enters 
into a contract, it takes on certain duties by virtue of its choice to contract and some 
duties are placed on it by virtue of its constitutional imperatives. She further states 
that owing to the government's distinct role within the constitutional framework, its 
contracts may sometimes be "moulded" by or "yield to" administrative law rules. 
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consider the statute as a whole and whether it contains internal mechanisms 
to secure compliance with its provisions and thereby prevent the mischief 
from surfacing. If the answer is in the affirmative, then there might be no 
need to declare the contract invalid. If the answer is in the negative, this will 
point to the contract’s being invalid, as there will be no mechanism that 
prevents the contract from bringing about the mischief the statute seeks to 
prevent. However, in public-private contractual relationships the courts 
adopt a strict approach and declare a contract invalid when it does not 
adhere to statutory requirements set to bolster competitive bidding 
processes for public contracts, as such non-adherence in itself is seen as 
bringing about the mischief sought to be prevented. 
Further, the courts consider whether the statute imposes civil or criminal 
liability for its violation in order to determine whether the legislature intended 
for a contract that falls within the prohibited conduct to be valid or invalid.67 
If the answer is in the affirmative, then an inference may be drawn that the 
legislature intended for such a contract to be invalid.68 However, such an 
inference may not be drawn where the liability attached sufficiently protects 
the public against the mischief the statute seeks to prevent.69 This rule was 
confirmed by the AD (as it then was) in the Pottie case, where it noted that 
since the Ordinance (that was in question) did not say that a violation of its 
provisions rendered the violating conduct invalid, then an inference had to 
be drawn from its wording and the fact that the prohibition was followed by 
a criminal sanction.70 The court further stated that such an inference was 
required by the rule of "construction" in terms of which conduct done in 
violation of a statutory prohibition backed by a sanction is on the face of it 
unlawful and invalid.71 However, the court pointed out that there was room 
for the relaxation of this rule as the deciding factor was the legislature's 
intention.72 This was later reiterated by the SCA in ABSA Insurance Brokers, 
where it pointed out that when the legislature attaches liability for the 
performance of certain conduct under a statute, it proscribes such conduct 
by implication.73 The court went on to say that such a proscription operates 
                                            
67 Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 182; also see Bhana, Nortje and Bonthuys 
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to invalidate such conduct, regardless of whether the statute so declared or 
not.74 However, the court held that there is room for the relaxation of this 
rule and that the liability imposed by the statute by itself does not necessarily 
render a contract that falls within the proscribed conduct invalid – the 
legislature's intention will be the deciding factor.75 It follows that when a 
statute attaches liability for the violation of its provisions, this is an indication 
that the legislature may have intended for the non-compliant contract to be 
invalid. However, the courts have to decide after this factual inquiry, 
depending on the circumstances of the case (bearing in mind the rest of the 
factors in the test) whether the legislature intended for the liability attached 
to vindicate the object of the statute and thereby prevent the mischief from 
surfacing or whether it sought to invalidate the contract as well. Therefore, 
the factors of the test should be considered even if the statute attaches 
liability for its violation, with a view to exercising a value judgment to 
determine whether the contract is valid or invalid. 
Further, the courts will consider the implications that may result from 
declaring the contract invalid.76 This includes determining whether 
invalidating the contract would be more burdensome and unjust than letting 
it endure as tainted by illegality.77 The way this factor is meant to operate 
was demonstrated in Qaukeni Local Municipality, where the SCA 
considered the implications of declaring the agreement invalid (though 
considered in a narrow respect in order to determine whether any injustice 
or burden would result from a declaration of invalidity).78 The court found 
that declaring the contract invalid does not heavily burden the party 
asserting it, while allowing the contract to endure would place a heavy 
burden on the contract-denier.79 The court further pointed out that such a 
burden on the contract-denier would be transferred to the government 
fiscus, and that such a situation could have been averted by adhering to the 
statutory requirements.80 Lastly, the SCA took into account the fact that the 
implications of declaring the contract invalid were not asymmetrically 
distributed on one party, thereby indicating that the legislature could not 
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have intended for such a contract to be invalid.81 In this regard the SCA 
emphasised that all similar contracts should have the same fate (either they 
will be valid or invalid), particularly in similar circumstances (in particular, 
those involving public-private contractual relationships). They cannot differ 
because the implications of declaring them invalid are not clearly 
perceivable.82 As pointed out above, the court concluded that the contract 
was invalid.83 Further, in ABSA Insurance Brokers the SCA considered the 
implications of declaring the contract under investigation in that case invalid, 
and emphasised the fact that the appellant did not sufficiently prove that any 
hardship would be placed on it if the contract were declared invalid.84 This 
indicates that the party asserting the contract carries the onus of proving 
that a heavy burden would be placed on it or it would suffer an injustice if 
the contract were declared invalid. In essence, the courts have to exercise 
a value judgment, taking into account the weight of the burdens and 
injustices that would be placed on the contracting parties should the contract 
be declared invalid. Ultimately the considerations above will be taken into 
account along with the overall effect of other factors in the test in order to 
determine whether the legislature intended for the contract to be valid or 
invalid. 
Lastly, as is the case in the broader context of statutory interpretation, 
likewise in the narrower context of statutory interpretation within the 
application of the test, the courts must take care to execute their 
constitutional mandate of promoting the "spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights."85 This appears from section 39(2) of the Constitution, which 
requires courts to adopt an interpretation of a particular statute that has the 
tendency of promoting the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights", 
as informed by its application as envisaged in section 8(1) of the 
Constitution.86 In addition, when a specific right is implicated the courts must 
consider the matter in the light of sections 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution, 
which as Bhana observed involves a two-fold test – a substantive inquiry 
and a procedural inquiry.87 The former is embodied in sections 8(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution and involves the consideration of the extent to which the 
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Bill of Rights horizontally applies in a particular case,88 while the latter is 
embodied in sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution and involves the 
consideration of how the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is meant 
to operate in that particular case.89 Bhana correctly submits that this two-
fold test largely causes the barrier between the direct and indirect 
horizontality of the Bill of Rights to fade away, as it is characterised by an 
interaction between the two within the two parts of the two-fold test to the 
extent that the barrier is largely left permeable.90 (This will be shown below.) 
While it is accepted that the horizontality of the Bill of Rights stretches its 
reach to the common law, including the law of contract as envisaged by 
sections 8(1) and 39(2) of the Constitution,91 this has not been received 
without tension. In the result, two schools of thought have emerged (a 
conservative and a progressive one) with different views as to how the Bill 
of Rights (particularly its underlying values) is meant to operate in the law 
of contract. 
The main concern of the conservative school of thought is that bringing 
equity considerations into the law of contract may result in commercial 
uncertainty, as their content is abstract and too broad.92 Certainty in the law 
of contract makes future interaction between contracting parties predictable. 
Making the enforcement of contractual terms contingent on a later 
determination of whether they are fair or not diminishes such certainty and 
makes the standards against which conduct is measured not the law but the 
presiding officer.93 To cement these concerns Brand gives examples of the 
"uncertainty and controversy" that resulted in the High Court because of the 
minority judgment of Olivier JA in Eerste Nationale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Bpk v Saayman,94 where the judge stated that the formal use of the 
existing rules of contract law could be relaxed in the circumstances of that 
case on grounds of equities.95 He submits that this uncertainty was later 
clarified by the SCA in Brisley v Drotsky,96 where the SCA explained that 
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Olivier JA's minority judgment in Saayman is not authority for judges to 
disregard existing rules of the law of contract because it appears that they 
will lead to an unjust outcome.97 
On the other hand, while the progressive school of thought acknowledges 
the seriousness of the concerns for certainty, they are nonetheless of the 
view that the Constitution seeks to develop prevailing legal rules so as to 
reflect its fundamental values.98 In addition, they maintain that courts should 
ensure that the law of contract reflects the fundamental values of the 
Constitution.99 In defence of their view, they argue that concerns about 
uncertainty brought about by infusing equity considerations into the law of 
contract are blown out of proportion by conservative thinkers, as it is being 
over-ambitious to believe that the law can ever be completely certain – a 
workable level of certainty will suffice.100 They further argue that the benefits 
of constitutionalising the law of contract outweigh a partial disruption of 
contractual certainty.101 From these submissions it seems that what is 
needed is a gradual and systematic incorporation of the values underlying 
the Constitution into contract law in order to preserve contractual certainty 
as far as possible. 
In order to achieve a systematic incorporation of the values underlying the 
Constitution into the law of contract (particularly, into the test), courts need 
concrete guidance. It is in this regard that Bhana and Meerkotter criticise 
the CC in the Botha case for its failure to clearly unpack "the content of the 
'objective normative value system' that is the Bill of Rights."102 The lack of 
jurisprudence (at least from the courts) as to the exact scope of the 
"objective normative value system that is the Bill of Rights"103 makes the 
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indirect horizontality of the Bill of Rights difficult to achieve and most 
probably leaves judges unwilling to make meaningful advances in the 
constitutionalisation of the law of contract. Fortunately, in Hyundai Motor 
Distributors104 the CC attempted to give guidance on how section 39(2) is 
meant to operate. It started by pointing out that section 39(2) serves as a 
guide to the interpretation of statutes in the constitutional dispensation and 
stated the following: 
[A]ll statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights. … As 
such, the process of interpreting the Constitution must recognise the context 
in which we find ourselves and the Constitution's goal of a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.105 
The CC explained that the "spirit" of the Constitution refers to the transitional 
and transformational characters of the constitutional framework, by 
extension; this includes "the Constitution's goal of a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights."106 The 
"purport" and "objects" of the Constitution are to be understood in the light 
of section 1 of the Constitution, which encompasses the fundamental values 
of the Constitution.107 Then, the CC pointed out that an interpretation that 
"promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" is one that 
promotes "a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights." In the final instance, the CC advised that, where 
a statutory provision can reasonably be interpreted in such a way that it 
remains consistent with the Constitution, such an interpretation should be 
adopted, and only when no such interpretation is available should the court 
revert to alternative remedies.108 At the very least, the guidance provided by 
the CC can be used by courts as a point of departure in the inquiry into the 
indirect horizontality of the Bill of Rights as required by section 39(2) and in 
the two-fold inquiry (mentioned above) when a specific right is implicated. 
Therefore, it is largely up to the courts to develop these guidelines gradually 
on a case-by-case basis in order to give content and precise scope to the 
"value system"109 that is the Bill of Rights. 
In essence, when the legislature has not clearly stated that a contract that 
violates a statutory provision is invalid, the courts should consider the 
overall effect of the factors mentioned above, in an attempt to determine 
whether the legislature intended for the non-compliant contract to be valid 
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or invalid. The court has to make a value judgment whether the legislature 
intended for the non-compliant contract to be invalid, or if it has attached 
liability to the prohibition, which adequately protects the object of the statute 
so that the mischief it seeks to prevent does not surface and the contract 
need not be declared invalid. If the court declares the non-compliant 
contract invalid then the consequences of illegality will follow, but if it is 
declared valid despite such non-compliance then a valid contract will exist. 
In the latter case the contracting parties get the benefit of contractual 
remedies. 
3 Cool Ideas v Hubbard 
In this case Cool Ideas concluded an agreement with Ms Hubbard (the 
construction agreement) in terms of which Cool Ideas was to build a home 
for Ms Hubbard against the payment of R2 695 600.00.110 Thereafter Cool 
Ideas commissioned Velvori Construction CC (Velvori) to perform the 
building works.111 When the construction agreement was concluded Cool 
Ideas was not licensed in terms of section 10 of the Housing Consumer 
Protection Measures Act112 (the Act) to certify its competence to build 
homes.113 In its defence Cool Ideas contended that it acted in accordance 
with the advice of the National Home Builders' Registration Council 
(NHBRC), that licensing was unnecessary before the commencement of the 
construction work.114 However, Velvori was duly licensed to build homes 
under the Act, and it duly "enrolled" the construction work as required by the 
Act.115 During the construction Ms Hubbard advanced certain sums of 
money to Cool Ideas, but upon completion of the superstructure she gave 
notice that she was not satisfied with certain aspects of the superstructure. 
Consequently she did not want to pay the outstanding balance of the agreed 
price.116 Thereafter, Ms Hubbard instituted arbitration proceedings claiming 
damages for the unsatisfactory construction work, but Cool Ideas 
counterclaimed for the outstanding amount of the agreed price for the 
construction of the house in the sum of R550 000.00.117 Pursuant to those 
proceedings an arbitral award was given in Cool Ideas' favour, and when 
Ms Hubbard refused to comply with the award, Cool Ideas approached the 
High Court asking for the award to be made a court order under section 31 
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of the Arbitration Act.118 During the exchange of pleadings pursuant to the 
action in the High Court, Cool Ideas was licensed under the Act as having 
the competence to build a home.119 However, Ms Hubbard contended that 
the arbitral award was invalid and unenforceable on the ground that it had 
the effect of enforcing an agreement that violates a statutory prohibition that 
is backed by the imposition of criminal liability.120 The CC had to determine 
whether the legislature intended for a non-compliant construction 
agreement to be invalid.121 Section 10 of the Act states the following: 
(1) No person shall –  
(a) carry on the business of a home builder; or 
(b) receive any consideration in terms of any agreement with a housing  
 consumer in respect of the sale or construction of a home,  
unless that person is a registered home builder. 
(2) No home builder shall construct a home unless that home builder is a  
      registered home builder.122 
Writing for the majority, Majiedt AJ began by seeking the correct 
interpretation of section 10(1)(b) of the Act. In this regard, the court stressed 
that in interpreting statutes, the words of the statute should be understood 
in their "ordinary grammatical meaning", except where such interpretation 
would lead to a ridiculous outcome.123 It added that there were three 
interconnected provisos to this principle: first, a purposive approach should 
be adopted in interpreting the relevant section; secondly, the approach 
should be context-sensitive; and thirdly, the section must be interpreted in 
a manner that is consistent with the Constitution.124 In its interpretation of 
section 10(1)(b) the court first dismissed Cool Ideas' heavy reliance on the 
word "receive" used in the section as being "misplaced."125 It stated that 
sections 10(1) and (2) should be understood holistically and properly 
contextualised within the structure and purpose of the Act as a whole.126 
The court understood the sections as mandating the licensing of "home 
builders" that conduct "the business of a home builder" and "home builders" 
that sell or build homes for home purchasers pursuant to an agreement 
between the "home builder" and the home purchaser.127 As such, it held that 
it is incorrect to isolate a single word in the relevant section in order to 
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construct an argument that violates the express wording of the section and 
the object of both the section and the Act as a whole.128 Lastly, the court 
held that even the fact that Velvori was licensed in terms of the Act did not 
remedy the violation by Cool Ideas of the relevant section, as section 10(7) 
mandates both contractors to be licensed.129 
In considering the structure of the Act, the court found that the object of the 
Act was to safeguard home purchasers.130 As such, the court concluded 
that the Act is premised on the existence of a construction agreement 
between a licensed "home builder" and a home purchaser, and therefore 
the Act cannot be interpreted to allow late licensing by a "home builder."131 
To bolster this conclusion the court relied on the provisions of section 13 of 
the Act, which provides the purpose of the NHBRC.132 It found that the 
purpose of the NHBRC as envisaged by that section is to control the building 
sector by safeguarding home purchasers and setting a threshold for the 
quality of the building work.133 It added that the home purchaser is most 
covered by the Act when a "home builder" is licensed before the 
construction work begins.134 To further support its conclusion, the court also 
considered the broad powers given to the NHBRC under section 5, the 
protective measures aimed at reinforcing the safeguards provided to home 
purchasers under section 13, the fact that enrolment after the construction 
work has begun is provided for without a similar provision relating to 
licensing, and lastly the fact that the licensing requirement for "home 
builders" is backed by civil and criminal liability.135 In the result, the court 
found that allowing late licensing would be contrary to the clearly 
perceivable purpose of the Act and also transgress the express wording and 
purpose of section 10(1)(b).136 The court also found that a contrary 
conclusion would mean that the home purchaser would have no recourse 
to the remedies provided by the Act for unsatisfactory building work, until 
the "home builder" elects to be licensed.137 
In determining whether Cool Ideas' constitutional property right had been 
arbitrarily stripped away, the court started by pointing out that the remaining 
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validity of the construction agreement meant that Cool Ideas had no 
recourse to an enrichment action at common law; as such, it would be 
unable to claim the remainder of the agreed price.138 The court then 
explained that based on its earlier decision in National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman,139 the right to claim money advanced to another person 
pursuant to an enrichment action amounts to property as envisaged in 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.140 While not explicitly stated in the 
judgment, this appears to be an undertaking of the substantive inquiry of the 
two-fold test mentioned above, as envisaged by section 8(2) of the 
Constitution. 
After determining that the property right was applicable in the present case, 
the court sought to determine whether the stripping away of Cool Ideas' 
property right was justifiable under the internal limitation of the implicated 
right (arbitrariness).141 Thereafter the court set out the test for arbitrariness 
– that the law of general application mentioned in section 25(1) should have 
a sufficient cause for stripping away the property of the relevant person, and 
that the method it employs should be fair.142 In determining whether there is 
sufficient cause, the court has to consider the type of property involved and 
the degree to which the law purports to strip it away.143 In this analysis, the 
court should also consider whether there is proportionality between the 
method used to strip the right away and the outcome the law aims to 
achieve.144 In applying this test the court found that there was proportionality 
between the method employed to strip away Cool Ideas' constitutional 
property right and the outcome the Act seeks to reach.145 The court reached 
its finding on the basis that the safeguarding of home purchasers is a 
legitimate government goal that is achieved through the creation of a 
compensation fund for the benefit of home purchasers in cases of 
substandard building work by "home builders."146 In order for this 
safeguarding method to function properly, "home builders" should be 
licensed so that they are brought within the records of the NHBRC for proper 
policing and so that they can make contributions to the compensation fund 
(this is the goal the provision in question seeks to achieve).147 The provision 
                                            
138 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 38. 
139 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC). 
140 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 38. 
141 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 39. 
142 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 40. 
143 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 40. 
144 Cool Ideas v Hubbard paras 40-41. 
145 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 41. 
146 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 42. 
147 Cool Ideas v Hubbard para 42. 
O GOLELA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  21 
requires the "home builder" only to be licensed and the licensing procedure 
is not cumbersome on the "home builder".148 The court added that the 
method used (stripping away of property right) had a circumscribed scope, 
in that it captures only unlicensed "home builders."149 It was held that 
stripping away of Cool Ideas' constitutional property right was not arbitrary 
and therefore the provision in question did not transgress section 25(1).150 
Again, while it is not expressly stated, the court appears to be undertaking 
the procedural inquiry in the two-fold test mentioned above. Note that while 
the test for arbitrariness involves the consideration of the fairness of the 
method used for stripping away the constitutional property right, the court 
does not expressly deal with the value of fairness in its application of the 
two-fold test or in its consideration of the test for arbitrariness. However, it 
does exercise a value judgment in determining the proportionality of the 
method used to the goals sought, which seems to be informed by the value 
of fairness, particularly, in its weighing up of the burden placed by the 
licensing process on a "home builder" as opposed to the prejudice that may 
be suffered by a home purchaser that contracted with an unlicensed "home 
builder". 
Further, in determining whether the construction agreement should be 
declared valid or invalid the court found that the structure of the Act does 
not point to the construction agreement being invalid.151 This is so because 
the provisions of sections 10(1) and (2) in the court's view are aimed at 
unlicensed "home builders" and preventing them from obtaining 
compensation for construction work they perform while unlicensed and not 
at the validity or invalidity of the construction agreement.152 The court also 
pointed out that declaring the construction agreement invalid would render 
useless the provision stripping away the unlicensed "home builder's" right 
to obtain compensation and other provisions aimed at safeguarding home 
purchasers.153 
Lastly, in considering whether equity considerations apply in this case the 
court held that they were not applicable, and even if they were it is 
undesirable for equity considerations to be applied in individual cases in 
order to circumvent the clear and unambiguous wording of a statute.154 
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In a separate judgment Jafta J agreed with the order handed down by the 
main judgment but disagreed with some of its reasoning on the ground that 
the construction agreement is invalidated by a proper interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the Act, even though the legislature did not expressly 
say so.155 
In determining whether the legislature intended for the agreement to be 
invalid, Jafta J started by stating that conduct done in violation of a statutory 
prohibition is void and of no force in law.156 He then pointed out that to 
ascertain whether such a violation renders the contract invalid, one must 
look at the text of the statute and whether the contract falls within the 
proscribed conduct.157 If so, the contract will be invalid except when it is 
clear from the purpose of that statute that the legislature did not intend to 
invalidate it.158 He then stated that there was nothing in the text of the Act 
which shows that the construction agreement should remain valid.159 Jafta 
J held that an agreement that violates the statutory prohibitions in question 
is invalid because it cannot give rights to the contracting parties.160 As such, 
he held that permitting any party to sue on any rights arising from the 
construction agreement would mean that the court is allowing the 
performance of unlawful conduct, hence when the validity of a statute itself 
is not challenged the courts should enforce its provisions.161 In support of 
these findings Jafta J stated that the validity of the non-compliant contract 
is not vitiated by the text of the prohibition but by the fact that it violates a 
statutory prohibition.162 This is because when the legislature wishes to 
prevent certain conduct it prohibits it, and courts cannot order the 
performance of conduct prohibited by a statute.163 
Jafta J noted that the object of the Act is the protection of "housing 
consumer[s]" through the mandatory licensing of "home builder[s]" before 
they commence construction work or they commission another builder to 
perform the construction work.164 He then held that the legislature seeks to 
achieve this purpose through the prohibitions in question and allowing an 
agreement that violates them to exist would limit the achievement of that 
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purpose.165 Therefore, he held that it would lead to an injustice and the 
violation of the Constitution to declare an agreement valid that can be 
enforced by only one party and not the other.166 He concluded that the 
legislature could not have intended for such a situation.167 
In his dissenting judgment, Froneman J mainly took issue with the manner 
in which the main judgment addressed the constitutional matters raised and 
its finding that equity considerations were not applicable.168 He disagreed 
with the way in which the main judgment interpreted section 10(1)(b), as its 
interpretation strips away Cool Ideas' property right.169 In the judge's view, 
section 10(1)(b) is capable of a reasonably practicable interpretation that 
does not strip away Cool Ideas' property right.170 Before setting out his 
approach Froneman J pointed out that the construction of Ms Hubbard's 
home was undertaken by a licensed "home builder" and that Cool Ideas was 
unlicensed at the beginning of the construction, because it was advised by 
the NHBRC that licensing was unnecessary.171 Therefore, the judge held 
that Ms Hubbard did not invoke section 10(1)(b) in order to rely on its 
safeguards to secure quality construction work from Cool Ideas, but to avoid 
paying the amount the arbitrator had ordered her to pay to Cool Ideas.172 In 
other words, the provision was not used in this case to seek refuge in its 
intended purpose (to safeguard home purchasers) but as part of a tactic to 
avoid paying remuneration to Cool Ideas for work done. This conclusion 
seems to be based on the fact that Ms Hubbard herself used the arbitration 
clause to set the arbitration in motion in order to obtain compensation for 
the alleged substandard building work by Cool Ideas.173 However, the 
arbitrator ordered her to pay the outstanding balance to Cool Ideas.174 It 
seems that the judge took it that the arbitrator was satisfied that in fact the 
building work met the threshold set by the statute and what Ms Hubbard 
was alleging was not true.  
Froneman J holds that since this matter was concerned with the taking away 
of Cool Ideas' ability to bring action based on an arbitral award that has not 
been challenged on the basis of unfairness in its proceedings or unfairness 
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in its findings, the court should adopt an approach that does not strip away 
Cool Ideas' property right.175 Further, he pointed out that the case was also 
concerned with the concept that courts should adopt an interpretation of a 
statute that advances the enjoyment and realisation of a constitutional right 
when such an interpretation can reasonably be achieved.176 The judge 
submits that in this case such an interpretation can reasonably be 
achieved.177 In this regard, he first looked at the object of the particular 
provision (which is to safeguard home purchasers), then he looked at the 
conduct that the Act sought home purchasers to attain.178 Thereafter he 
concluded that the object of the Act as a whole is to ensure that "home 
builder[s]" maintain acceptable standards of quality in building homes for 
home purchasers.179 He then points out that the Act can be interpreted in a 
manner that safeguards home purchasers while not stripping away Cool 
Ideas' constitutional property right.180 
The first step in his interpretation is to take note that the relevant provisions 
impose criminal liability on an unlicensed "home builder" who has built a 
home – this strongly encourages "home builder[s]" to be licensed before 
commencing the construction of a home.181 He then proposes that the 
prohibition on the receipt of payment by an unlicensed "home builder" 
should be interpreted restrictively and in isolation from the other 
prohibitions. As such it should be interpreted to mean that the proscribed 
conduct "applies only at the time of receipt …, but you can register late."182 
In support of this proposition he states that the particular provision is not 
qualified to reinforce the requirement of licensing, such as "unless the 
person is a registered home builder at the time of undertaking the 
construction."183 He further cites the fact that the Act makes provision for 
monitoring bodies such as the Minister and the NHBRC to oversee that the 
purpose of the Act is achieved and that the home purchaser is exposed to 
minimal risk.184 He then points out that this interpretation will not prejudice 
Ms Hubbard, as she will still have the protection provided by the Act.185 
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4 Analysis 
This part evaluates whether the CC applied the test for statutory illegality 
correctly and whether it properly considered the different factors of the test. 
Here I criticise the CC for its incomplete consideration of the impact of the 
Constitution on its interpretation of section 10(1)(b).  
Then I carefully consider the conclusion of the main judgment that equity 
considerations were not applicable in this case. I argue that this conclusion 
is contrary to section 39(2) of the Constitution and disregards the indirect 
horizontality of the Bill of Rights. 
Lastly I discuss whether the approach adopted by the CC in applying the 
test and its constitutionalisation is desirable, particularly in the constitutional 
dispensation. 
4.1  The CC's application of the test for statutory illegality in contract 
law 
The main issue in this case was the determination of whether section 
10(1)(b) requires a "home builder" to get licensed before the construction 
work begins or allows for late licensing. Whilst the main judgment and that 
of Froneman J largely considered the different factors of the test, the point 
of disjuncture in the two judgments is the impact of the Constitution, 
including the application of its underlying values. Whereas the main 
judgment acknowledges the impact of the Constitution in its three provisos 
to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation (mentioned above), it 
held that the structure of the Act mandates a "home builder" to get licensed 
before the construction work begins, and a contrary interpretation would 
defeat the express wording of section 10(1)(b).186 The court acknowledged 
that its interpretation of section 10(1)(b) strips away Cool Ideas' property 
right, nonetheless it found that the provision reasonably and justifiably limits 
Cool Ideas' property right in accordance with the internal limitation of section 
25(1) of the Constitution.187 Froneman J's judgment also acknowledges the 
impact of the Constitution in statutory interpretation, but emphasises the 
principle that courts should adopt an interpretation of a statute that "best" 
advances the enjoyment and realisation of a constitutional right.188 In this 
regard Froneman J submits that section 10(1)(b) is capable of a reasonably 
practicable interpretation that does not strip away Cool Ideas' property right, 
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and this interpretation should be adopted.189 It becomes clear from these 
two views that courts lack concrete guidance as to how the Constitution 
(including its underlying values) should apply in the test for statutory 
illegality. 
It is appropriate to set out the methodology in terms of which the Bill of 
Rights ought to apply in private relations, particularly in the test for statutory 
illegality. As mentioned above, when a specific right is implicated, the matter 
should be considered in terms of sections 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution.190 
This inquiry should be done in accordance with the two-fold test advanced 
by Bhana, in terms of which sections 8(1) and (2) envisage the substantive 
inquiry of the two-fold test.191 The substantive inquiry of the two-fold test 
obliges the courts to undertake a context-sensitive inquiry in order to 
ascertain whether it is appropriate for the particular right or duty to apply 
between private parties.192 Within this investigation, courts must take into 
account the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning that particular right, 
including the fundamental values of the Constitution (freedom, dignity and 
equality) and the vision of the Constitution as embodied in the preamble to 
the Constitution.193 The procedural inquiry of the two-fold test as embodied 
in sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution obliges the courts to determine 
whether the statute in question sufficiently facilitates the enjoyment and 
realisation of the implicated right.194 If so, the statute will be seen as giving 
sufficient effect to the implicated right or as being a reasonable and 
justifiable limitation of the implicated right, and the inquiry will end here.195 
When considering whether the implicated statute sufficiently facilitates the 
enjoyment and realisation of the implicated right, courts must remember that 
at first instance, legal matters should generally be dealt with in accordance 
with legal rules.196 In statutory interpretation this means that the courts 
should first seek an interpretation of a statute that is in line with the Bill of 
Rights before seeking to strike down the statute for being inconsistent with 
the Bill of Rights.197 In other words, the courts should first seek to interpret 
the implicated statute in a way that enhances the implicated right to the 
degree of its application in that particular case as found in the substantive 
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inquiry of the two-fold test. Only when that interpretation is not reasonably 
practicable should the court consider whether the statute reasonably and 
justifiably limits the implicated right. This was also stated in Govender v 
Minister of Safety and Security,198 where the SCA stated that in dealing with 
the constitutional validity of a statute, courts should first assess the purpose 
of the statute and the provision in question, then assess the scope and 
meaning of the implicated right, and thereafter determine whether the 
statute can be interpreted in a way that is in line with the Constitution.199 If 
the statute is capable of such an interpretation, then such an interpretation 
must be adopted.200 It should be noted that the court's interpretive powers 
in this investigation are circumscribed to an interpretation that is reasonably 
practicable in the light of the purpose of the statute.201 In the last instance, 
if the only practicable interpretation violates the implicated right, the court 
should determine whether the right is capable of being limited in accordance 
with its internal limitation or section 36 of the Constitution.202 If the violation 
cannot be justified then the statute must be struck down as 
unconstitutional.203 
Both the main judgment and that of Froneman J seem to have undertaken 
the substantive inquiry of the two-fold test (section 8(2)), and correctly found 
that section 25(1) of the Constitution applies in this case and that the result 
of the remaining validity of the construction agreement would be to strip 
away Cool Ideas' constitutional property right. However, the main judgment 
can be criticised for its incomplete undertaking of this inquiry, as it neither 
took into account the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning section 25(1) 
nor the fundamental values of the Constitution. The main judgment could 
have done this within the procedural inquiry of the two-fold test as part of 
the arbitrariness test (in which fairness is a factor to be considered in 
determining proportionality). Hence, the main judgment's consideration of 
the internal limitation of section 25(1) can be criticised for not being 
sufficiently comprehensive. If the use of the internal limitation of section 
25(1) could not sufficiently justify the violation, then the court could have 
undertaken the broader section 36 justification inquiry, which could have 
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allowed for a more context-sensitive justification inquiry.204 On the other 
hand, Froneman J took into account the value of fairness in relation to his 
proposed interpretation of the relevant statutory provision.205 Froneman J's 
approach can also be criticised for not connecting the value of fairness with 
the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning section 25(1) or the broader 
fundamental values of the Constitution. In other words, Froneman J did not 
justify his use of fairness based on the "spirit, purport and objects" 
underpinning section 25(1) or the fundamental constitutional values of 
dignity, freedom and equality or in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
This means that Froneman J uses a free-floating concept of fairness, which 
raises the concerns of uncertainty stressed by the conservative school of 
thought (discussed above).206 
Further, both the main judgment and that of Froneman J undertook the 
procedural inquiry of the two-fold test (section 8(3)). While Froneman J was 
of the view that his alternative interpretation is reasonably practicable in the 
light of the purpose of the Act, the main judgment was of the view that such 
an interpretation violates the express wording of section 10(1)(b) and both 
its purpose and that of the Act as a whole.207 The question then becomes 
whether the interpretation proposed by Froneman J is reasonably 
practicable in the light of the purpose of the Act. If not, then the only 
practicable interpretation will be that of the main judgment, which involves 
a reasonable and justifiable limitation of section 25(1). 
First, section 10(1)(a) prohibits any "person" from conducting "the business 
of a home builder" without being licensed, while section 10(2) prohibits a 
"home builder" from building a home without being licensed. The Act defines 
a "home builder" as "a person who carries on the business of a home 
builder."208 It appears that the two sections are linked and the use of the 
word "person" in section 10(1)(a) and the word "home builder" in section 
10(2) indicates that these provisions aim to capture not only incompetent 
builders, but also those that have the competence to build homes but are 
not licensed under the Act. It is important to note that these provisions are 
not characterised by the non-receipt of payment. Section 10(1)(b) seems to 
be aimed particularly at incompetent builders in that it prohibits any "person" 
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from getting payment pursuant to "any agreement" with a home purchaser 
relating to the selling or building of a home without such a person being 
licensed in terms of the Act. The Act then attaches civil and criminal liability 
for the violation of sections 10(1) and (2).209 It is important to note that 
section 21(1) does not distinguish between section 10(1)(a) and section 
10(1)(b). This means that a person that falls within the conduct prohibited 
by section 10(1)(b) is faced with both the liability in terms of section 21(1) 
and the non-receipt of payment. This indicates that the legislature intended 
for incompetent builders who perform any conduct relating to the selling or 
building of a home under "any agreement" with a home purchaser without 
being licensed to incur liability and be deprived from getting payment. This 
also indicates that the view of Froneman J in support of late licensing is not 
reasonably practicable, as late licensing would defeat the purpose of 
sections 10(1)(b) and 21(1) and go against the wording of the former 
provision. Cool Ideas was unfortunate to fall within section 10(1)(b) owing 
to its subcontract with Velvori. Had it not subcontracted Velvori, it may have 
fallen within a different prohibition. 
Secondly, Froneman J supports his interpretation by adding that section 
10(1)(b) is not qualified by the incorporation of particular words (mentioned 
above) to reinforce the requirement for licensing.210 However, this approach 
overlooks the fact that the section is formulated in negative terms, in that it 
uses the words "no person shall" at the beginning and it further uses a 
commanding term like "shall", which indicates that the section is peremptory 
and that the person at whom it is directed has no choice but to abide by its 
wording.211 Ultimately, while the interpretation proposed by Froneman J 
attempts to save the Act from potentially violating the Constitution, it also 
has the effect of limiting the protection the legislature sought to afford to 
home purchasers. Consequently, it appears that the interpretation proposed 
by Froneman J is not reasonably practicable in the light of the purpose of 
the Act, and the interpretation in the main judgment is to be preferred. 
As a final point, Jafta J reached a different conclusion and found that the 
construction agreement is invalid. In essence, he was of the view that when 
a statute prohibits the performance of certain conduct, a contract that falls 
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within such conduct is automatically invalidated by the prohibition, as the 
legislature intended to prevent such a contract through the prohibition.212 In 
the light of the test for statutory illegality set out above, Jafta J's view should 
be rejected as it incorrectly reflects the legal position relating to statutory 
illegality. 
4.2 The manner in which the CC purports to constitutionalise the test 
In considering whether equity considerations apply in this case, the main 
judgment found that they were not applicable and even if they were, it is 
undesirable for equity considerations to be applied in individual cases in 
order to circumvent the clear and unambiguous wording of a statute.213 In 
this regard Froneman J disagreed and pointed to the court's earlier decision 
that in assessing whether a term of an arbitration agreement violates public 
policy, the public policy scale must be informed by the "spirit, purport and 
objects" of the Bill of Rights.214 It must be noted that the operation of equity 
considerations as envisaged by section 39(2) of the Constitution does not 
seek to circumvent the clear and unambiguous wording of a statute, but 
ensures that the "application" and "interpretation" of that statute enhances 
and is in line with the "objective normative value system"215 that is the Bill of 
Rights. The question to be determined relates to the applicability of equity 
considerations as envisaged in section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
The direct horizontality of the Bill of Rights means that it creates rules and 
remedies of its own in cases where ordinary rules of law are not in line with 
its provisions.216 On the other hand, the indirect horizontality of the Bill of 
Rights means that the Bill of Rights is seen as an "objective normative value 
system" which represents a community of values that must be reflected in 
the interpretation, development or application of "all law".217 When applied 
in this manner, the Bill of Rights does not create legal rules but operates 
through the rules of law by requiring its underlying values to be reflected in 
the application of such legal rules.218 As stated above, when a specific right 
is implicated, the courts should approach the matter in accordance with the 
two-fold test advanced by Bhana. As submitted by Bhana (and seen above) 
the two-fold test involves an interaction between direct and indirect 
horizontality at both levels of the two-fold test to the extent that the barrier 
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between direct and indirect horizontality is largely left permeable.219 
Therefore, even when a specific right is implicated, its "spirit, purport and 
objects" must be investigated and enhanced through the interpretation, 
application or development of the relevant law. In addition, it is submitted 
that section 39(2) provides for the indirect horizontality of the Bill of Rights 
as informed by its application in terms of section 8(1) and mandates the 
courts to adopt an interpretation of a statute that enhances the Bill of Rights 
and its underlying values.220 It is further submitted that section 39(2) applies 
in all matters even where no guaranteed substantive right is implicated, 
even in cases where a party to the dispute does not base its case on section 
39(2).221 Therefore, equity considerations will apply in all matters – when a 
specific right is implicated they will be considered within the substantive 
inquiry of the two-fold test in considering the "spirit, purport and objects" 
underpinning that right (and the fundamental constitutional values), and 
when no right is implicated equity considerations will apply through existing 
legal rules. The guidelines provided by the CC in Hyundai Motor Distributors 
should be used as the point of departure in the investigation of the content 
of the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning a particular right or the Bill 
of Rights as a whole. As such, Froneman J was correct in his finding that 
equity considerations were applicable, but he failed to ground his 
consideration of the value of fairness either in the "spirit, purport and 
objects" underpinning the implicated right or in the broader fundamental 
values of the Constitution. 
4.3 Desirability of the CC's approach to the test and its 
constitutionalisation 
While the main judgment and that of Froneman J largely consider the 
relevant factors of the test, they do not properly deal with the issues relating 
to the impact of the Constitution on the matter at hand. The difficulty lies in 
the determination of the proper approach to the interpretation of section 
10(1)(b) of the Act in order to facilitate Cool Ideas' enjoyment and realisation 
of its constitutional property right as envisaged by section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. On this point, the main judgment seems to have gone to the 
extremes of objectivity in interpreting the relevant provision, while Froneman 
J seems to have gone to the extremes of subjectivity. It is submitted that 
statutes (as laws of general application) should in principle be interpreted 
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objectively to apply broadly within the community.222 However, even within 
this objective interpretation, statutes should be contextualised by taking into 
account the broader society, its history and its goals. If statutes are 
interpreted to accommodate individual cases, this may lead to a situation 
where the law provides individual solutions for individual cases, which is 
undesirable and renders the law unworkable. In order to make statutory 
interpretation more accommodating in individual cases, within the 
application of the test for statutory illegality, courts may use the "balance of 
convenience" test. The "balance of convenience" test allows the court to 
investigate the implications of its decision within the context and 
circumstances of the case before it. Here it can adjust its decision in relation 
to the hardships and injustices that it may cause to the parties involved (as 
discussed above). Therefore, the ideal approach to the constitutionalisation 
of the test is somewhere between that of the main judgment and that of 
Froneman J. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has explained how the test for statutory illegality is meant to 
operate. It has done so in the following terms. When the legislature has not 
clearly stated that an agreement that violates a statutory prohibition is 
invalid, the courts should consider the overall effect of the following factors 
– the language of the provision in question, the object of the provision in the 
light of the object of the statute as a whole and the mischief it seeks to 
prevent, the presence of civil or criminal liability, any perceivable implication 
that may result from declaring the agreement invalid, and the constitutional 
mandate of promoting the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,"223 
When a specific right is implicated, the courts must consider the matter in 
the light of sections 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution, which consideration 
involves a two-fold test – a substantive inquiry (embodied in sections 8(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution) and a procedural inquiry (embodied in sections 
8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution).224 Courts must weigh up these factors 
with a view to exercising a value judgment to determine whether the contract 
is valid or void. The relative weight of each factor depends on the 
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circumstances of the case. 
Then the paper investigated the CC's application of the test for statutory 
illegality. Here it criticised the main judgment for its incomplete undertaking 
of the sections 8(1) and (2) inquiry, as it neither took into account the "spirit, 
purport and objects" underpinning section 25(1) nor the fundamental values 
of the Constitution. It also criticised Froneman J's judgment for not 
connecting the value of fairness with the "spirit, purport and objects" 
underpinning section 25(1) or the broader fundamental values of the 
Constitution. 
Then it considered the applicability of equity considerations in this case. 
Here it pointed out that the operation of equity considerations ensures that 
the "application" and "interpretation" of the statute in question enhances and 
is in line with the "objective normative value system"225 that is the Bill of 
Rights. In this regard, it found that equity considerations apply in all matters. 
When a specific right is implicated, equity considerations should be 
considered within the substantive inquiry of the two-fold test in considering 
the "spirit, purport and objects" underpinning that right (and the fundamental 
constitutional values). When no right is implicated, equity considerations 
should apply through existing legal rules as envisaged in section 39(2) of 
the Constitution. 
Lastly, it considered the desirability of the CC's approach to the application 
of the test and its constitutionalisation. Here it found that the main judgment 
and that of Froneman J largely consider the relevant factors of the test, but 
the former goes to the extremes of objectivity in interpreting the statute, 
while the latter goes to the extremes of subjectivity. It pointed out that the 
court could have used the "balance of convenience" test to adjust its 
decision to accommodate the context and circumstances of this case. 
Consequently, the approach to constitutionalising the test lies somewhere 
between that of the main judgment and that of Froneman J. 
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